The relationship between innovation disclosures and information asymmetry in brazil
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24023/FutureJournal/2175-5825/2022.v14i1.489Keywords:
Innovation disclosure, Information asymmetry, Probability of Informed Trading, Structural equation modelingAbstract
Objective: The study sought to analyze the innovation disclosure strategies carried out by publicly traded Brazilian companies and verify their impacts on information asymmetry.
Method: Innovation disclosure strategies were analyzed through 71 annual reports issued by Brazilian companies traded on B3, identifying six categories of analysis: Strategy focused on innovation, Innovation goals, Alliances made, Financial planning, Innovation results and Awards obtained. The relationship between the categories and information asymmetry was analyzed using structural equation modeling.
Main results: The results indicated that disclosures about innovations strategies, alliances made, financial planning and the awards obtained can reduce information asymmetry.
Relevance/originality: Previous studies seek to analyze the dissemination of information, and do not specifically address innovation. However, even if such disclosures are permeated by secrecy, they may be reflected in the trading of assets.
Theoretical/methodological contributions: The study stands out for presenting a model for analyzing the quality of innovation dissemination, allowing the evaluation of the extent of information. In contrast, previous studies seek to assess the volume of information disclosed. Furthermore, it draws a direct relationship on information asymmetry.
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